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Is it possible to discern a point at which technology becomes 
antithetical to Christian aspirations? Consider the following 
vignettes: 
H aroesting Organs and Selling Kidneys 
On AprilS, 1990, after a 35-day hearing, the General Medi-
cal Council found a physician and two surgeons guilty of 
serious professional misconduct. Dr. Raymond Crockett, a 
physician in private practice in London's Harley Street and at 
the National Kidney Centre, was struck off the medical Reg-
ister, and Mr. Michael Bewick and Mr. Michael Joyce had 
restrictions placed on their practice following their involve-
ment in a kidney-for-sale scandal. The case concerned trans-
plant operations with kidneys removed from Turkish donors, 
unrelated to the recipients, who had been brought to London 
and paid for their organs. 
Repairing Brains Using Aborted Fetuses 
In January 1994, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
awarded a grant to study fetal tissue implants as a treatment for 
Parkinson's disease. The plan is to transplant fetal tissue that 
produces the neurotransmitter dopamine into the brains of 
Parkinson's patients, in the hopes of alleviating the dopamine 
deficit that afflicts them. Similar implants in the past have 
produced mixed results. But the new $4.5 million study 
involving 40 patients, is the largest, most ambitious study of 
implants to date. 
Dead Mothers and Living Babies 
At noon on 5 October 1992, Marion Ploch, a dental assistant, 
was on her way home from work. She was 13 weeks pregnant. 
On the road she crashed her car against a tree. Because she was 
suffering from a fractured skull, the young woman was taken 
by helicopter to the university hospital in Erlanger where she 
was treated in the intensive care unit. Her parents were 
informed that Marion had no chance of survival. At first the 
doctors wanted to get their approval for organ donation. Later 
other doctors came with other views. They also regarded 
Marion's situation as hopeless; however, on the evidence of 
comparable cases in the literature they thought the fetus 
would have a real chance of survival. At this time the doctors 
sought the parents' agreement to keeping Marion coupled to 
the apparatus that was maintaining her bodily functions. The 
father of the child was unknown and did not appear in the days 
following. 
On 8 October the doctors confirmed that brain death had 
occurred. but did not turn off the respirator. On 9 October, 
Marion's parents sent a cry for help to a newspaper. Amid 
emotional public discussion, the doctors did everything pos-
sible to keep the fetus alive. On 16 November, almost 6 weeks 
after the diagnosis of brain death, the fetus was spontaneously 
aborted. l 
Unraveling Ethical Directions 
It is not my intention to discuss any of the vignettes in 
detail. I am far more concerned to discover what general 
principles may be of assistance in directing us as we tackle 
issues of this type. I shall endeavor, therefore, to paint with a 
broad brush. 
Deriving Good from Evil 
We are prepared to benefit from tragedies, and this is 
regarded as an ethically valid stance as long as we are in no way 
responsible for the tragedies and if we would have prevented 
them had we been in a position to do so.2 For instance, many 
studies of malnourished children have thrown a great deal of 
light on the effects of malnutrition on the developing brain, 
while studies of the after effects of the atom bomb explosions 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have proved of enormous value in 
understanding the long term effects of radiation on human 
populations. Moreover, Jewish doctors in the Warsaw ghetto 
made systematic studies of their starving compatriots in order 
to reap some scientific good from the evil that was destroying 
them alP Recent studies of relevance in this context would 
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include those on the brains of suicide victims in an attempt to 
throw light on the pathogenesis of depression,4 and on fetuses 
aborted for suspected fetal abnormality in order to determine 
the accuracy of midtrimester diagnosis of fetal abnormality.s 
The scientific studies have had as their aim increased 
understanding of a range of pathologies. Under no circum-
stances has this desire for increased understanding lent legiti-
macy to the original acts; it has merely epitomized the possi-
bility of benefiting from tragedies, and of deriving as much 
good as possible from evil. The one proviso is that killing and 
maiming are never undertaken in order to yield scientific data. 
It was the lack of such a proviso that constituted the scandal of 
the early days of modern anatomy, and the horror perpetrated 
by the Nazis, although even here the retrospective use of such 
data to benefit others is another issue. 
As a result, we should not be surprised that cadavers may, on 
occasion, be used to assist others in a variety of ways. This, 
itself, is not unethical. Indeed, it may be associated with a 
range of exceedingly worthy motives and actions. Neverthe-
less, even the possibility that the death of one may contribute 
to life for another should be approached with caution, since the 
highest of intentions may be taken advantage of for unworthy 
ends, and the dying or dead may be exploited or simply 
overlooked. 
Moral Complicity: Can Good be Derivedfrom EvilP 
Can the evil that led to the original death be disentangled 
from the good that could result from it? For example, if 
induced abortion is considered a moral evil, use of brain 
material derived from the abortus for transplantation into a 
patient with Parkinson's disease may itself be tainted with the 
original evil.6 According to the notion of moral complicity, the 
benefit intended to be derived from use of this material 
becomes no benefit at all, if there is no way of breaking the 
thread of evil linking the two. 
But is the theory of "moral complicity" too all-embracing a 
notion? I would argue that it is. If human tissue from any 
source is used, there is almost inevitably inadvertent involve-
ment in some moral evil. It may be in the road toll when organs 
are used from the victims of automobile accidents, in homicide 
when organs are used from murder victims, in suicide when 
organs are used from those who have committed suicide, or in 
poverty when the cadavers of the destitute are used for 
dissection. To suggest that the surgeon or anatomist is in a 
supportive alliance with intoxicated car drivers, murderers, 
those who commit suicide, or an inequitable social system, 
bears little relationship to moral reality. There is a moral dis-
tance between the evil and the intended good. 
Moral Values in the Use of Cadavers 
Cadavers have both intrinsic and instrumental value. The 
closest we come to recognizing a cadaver's intrinsic value, that 
is, its worth, in and for itself, is when we argue that a person and 
her body are more or less inseparable, and that the intrinsic 
value of a living person is bestowed upon her cadaver at death. 
We recognize each other because we recognize each other's 
bodies, and while this applies supremely during life, some 
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very important aspects of this identity continue following 
death. 
The instrumental value of a cadaver, that is, its use as a means 
to an end, emerges when it is recognized as the source of 
memories and responses. As we remember a person who has 
died, we respect the person who was, and this leads to respect 
for the person's remains. In addition, relatives and friends of 
the deceased are now grieving the death, and the cadaver is an 
integral part of the initial grieving process. The cadaver's 
instrumental value is also evident when it serves as a source of 
organs. 
We respect a person-now-dead when account is taken of 
that person's wishes when alive. Only in this way do we 
recognize a continuum between the two, and hence the 
cadaver's intrinsic value. Similarly, when account is taken of 
the wishes and feelings of still-living relatives and friends, and 
their relationships with the deceased, the cadaver's instru-
mental value is recognized.7 
With respect to organ donation, the first moral value nor-
mally considered is that of autonomy, according to which, each 
individual should have autonomous control over the disposi-
tion of his or her body after death, regardless of social need or 
the public interest.s Donation implies that the people con-
cerned made afree and informed decision prior to their death, to 
allow their own bodies to serve as the source of transplanted 
organs. In acting in this way, they are giving something more 
closely identified than anything else with what they are and 
represent.9 
This individual also has sets of relationships, and this brings 
into focus a second set of moral values, that of the interests of 
family members, who can in certain jurisdictions override the 
wishes of the deceased. Whenever this occurs, it brings with 
it an apparent clash of moral values-between the prior au-
tonomy and interests of the deceased, and the actual au-
tonomy and interests of the living. 
Underlying these values is a premise that the giving of one's 
body is preferable to being coerced into doing it. This is the 
value of altruism, according to which it is better to give than to 
receive, and the good of others is better than self-interest. lo 
The gift element is central to this value, and from this perspec-
tive an opt-in scheme for organ donation is preferable to an 
opt-out scheme that lacks altruistic intentions, since an organ 
is taken without permission and the person concerned is 
unable to defend his or her bodily integrity. 
A further value stems from a common response, namely, 
that death, especially when premature or unexpected, is tragic. 
Some people may find solace and meaning in the use of body 
parts to assist others. This is the redemptive aspect of organ 
donations. 
Tragedy and injustice can be transformed by redemptive 
actions. Death for one may usher in life for another, although 
the manner in which this is accomplished takes us to the heart 
of ethical discourse. Integral to the values I have sketched is 
an ideal enshrining the autonomy, decision-making capaci-
Hies, relationships, and family interests of both the deceased 
-and the living. When these values are recognized, altruism 
emerges as foundational. With this framework, the inequities 
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of many situations and the unethical nature of others can begin 
to be addressed. 
With this in mind, I shall turn to a fourth vignette. 
Transforming Diseased Lives Using New Genes 
Almost nine months before she was born, Brittany Nicole 
Abshire passed the most important test she will ever take. Her 
parents, Renee and David, are both healthy carriers of the trait 
for Tay-Sachs disease. After they lost one daughter to Tay-
Sachs in 1989, they swore they would never have another child 
unless they could be sure it would be free of the disease. 
Genetic tests could diagnose the condition before birth, but 
the Abshires' religious beliefs ruled out abortion as a way of 
screening for healthy fetuses. 
There seemed to be no hope until the Abshires learned 
about a new technology called preimplantation genetic test-
ing. The experimental procedure had already been used to 
screen more than a dozen children for cystic fibrosis. Ova and 
sperm were collected from the Abshires and several ova were 
successfully fertilized in vitro. After three days and with the 
embryos at the eight-cell stage, one cell was removed and its 
DNA was analyzed. 
For four of the embryos, the analysis worked: one of them 
showed the combination of genes responsible for Tay-Sachs 
disease, whereas the remaining three were not even carriers. 
These three embryos were implanted in Renee, and one 
survived to become Brittany, who was born in January, 1994. 
Courtesy of genetic testing, Brittany is the first child ever 
certified to be free of Tay-Sachs disease before entering her 
mother's womb. ll 
Precise Control 
One might be tempted to argue that, in this case, there is 
only a good: the elimination of a deleterious gene and hence 
the disease produced by that gene. A healthy person is born 
rather than a diseased one. Nevertheless, this has been 
accomplished by eliminating embryos that could have devel-
oped further and may have given rise to living human persons, 
and also by a considerable degree of control over prenatal 
existence. While other forms of gene therapy raise different 
issues, dependence upon a major degree of control over the 
constitution of future individuals is always present. l2 
This prompts fears that technology is out of control and is 
subverting the human condition, enslaving human beings, and 
mocking all they stand for as individuals created by God, with 
higher purposes, and with responsibilities for themselves, for 
others, and for their world. 
Playing God 
Surprising as it may seem, a theological perspective does 
not of necessity support these contentions, since humans are 
made in God's image, and so in some of our attributes we are 
to function like God.13 Regardless of how much our God-
likeness has been shattered by sin and rebellion, we remain 
images of our maker, albeit tarnished images. As such, we 
demonstrate a great deal of his creativity and inquisitiveness. 
Consequently, humans as scientists are humans as God's 
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images, probing and thrusting into the creation, attempting to 
understand it and make it accountable to God's stewards. 
Within the medical sphere, the desire is to exercise at least 
limited control over evil in the form of disease, disease that 
would ravish and destroy all that is beautiful and worthy in 
God's world. 14 
Consequently, genetic advance per se is not synonymous 
with pride and arrogance; in no way does it amount to the aping 
of God's power, since gene therapy owes its rationale to this 
power. As long as the aim of gene therapy is the alleviation of 
human illness, it has the potential to elevate God's images. 
This is where therapeutic interventions fit in. By contrast, the 
attempt to create some new creature with superlative powers 
would be to play God in a pejorative sense, since it would stem 
from human conceit regarding the all-too-limited nature of 
human ability and human wisdom. A more balanced view is 
that playing God should remind us that we tamper with 
fundamental biological processes only with caution and great 
humility; there is much we do not know, and there is much 
over which we have only perfunctory control. We are to play 
God, but we are to do it with intelligence and compassion. 
Tinkering with Nature 
Genetic technology is frequently considered to go further 
than playing God-to be actually interfering with nature. IS It 
is difficult to see how genetic technology per se does this. 
Nature has given us genetic combinations that lead to Tay-
Sachs disease, diabetes, and heart disease, but few would 
argue that these particular combinations constitute a good. 
Medicine has traditionally done its best to cope with genetic 
conditions, and these have not, in and of themselves, been 
regarded as transgressing the boundary oflicit human endeavor. 
Humans have intruded into nature throughout recorded hu-
man history, whether it has been by draining swamps infested 
with malaria-bearing mosquitoes or by using antibiotics. 16 It 
is far more important to ask whether the intrusions enhance or 
diminish the human condition. 
Within a Christian context, we may also ask whether they 
enhance or diminish our ability to respond to God and to 
appreciate the world He has brought into being and sustains. 
Nature is not to be worshipped as if it were some unchanging 
given; neither is the human genome to be elevated to some 
untouchable status as if it were fixed and immutable)7 Hu-
mans have been given stewardship of the created order, 
including the human genome. What is required is that we 
determine the sort of interference with nature and the genome 
that will advance human welfare, while respecting the dimen-
sions of what it means to be human. This requires a great deal 
of enlightened ethical discernment, and an awareness of the 
tentative path along which we are travelling. 18 
Slippery Slope 
It may still be objected that gene therapy (for instance, 
preimplantation genetic testing, or somatic cell gene therapy) 
is unethical since it represents the beginning of a slippery slope, 
the inevitable end result of which will be germ line gene 
therapy and eugenics. But is this progression inevitable? 
4 
Implicit within the slippery slope argument is the assumption 
that permission to allow one kind of intervention holds for all 
kinds of intervention. However, this is not the case in moral 
reasoning, where there is an immense gulf between different 
sorts of measures. For instance, there is a considerable moral 
chasm between gene therapy to treat disease (such as cancer 
or heart disease) and gene manipulation to alter behavior or 
morality. 19 This is the boundary between the world of therapy 
and the alleviation of disease on the one hand, and eugenics 
and enhancement on the other; and it is a boundary where 
there is a logical and moral stop sign. 20 Any ethical approach 
to gene therapy in general has to maintain that gulf and the 
moral world enshrined by it. 
The additional move to genetic enhancement and eugenics 
is a move from the world of finding cures to diseases that kill 
and disfigure and that limit basic human capacities, to a world 
of ideal is tic attempts to perfect the human species and improve 
fundamental human attributes. 21 Once we moved into this 
latter world we would have placed ourselves on a slippery 
slope towards perfectibility and manipulation. 22 But that is 
not where we are at the moment, and that is not where any 
serious geneticist or ethicist would wish us to be. 
Some Christians are unhappy with this sentiment, on the 
ground that sinful humans cannot be trusted to act responsi-
bly.23 Nevertheless, we do act in these ways in many other 
dangerous areas, whether these be the use of motor vehicles, 
or of tranquilizers, or of nuclear power. In none of these areas 
can humans be trusted as much as we would like, but reflec-
tions of God's image still remain and often restrain the more 
extreme actions of which humans are capable. Nonetheless, 
the genetic realm is a potentially dangerous one, and this is a 
salutary reminder to all who would indulge in its possible 
excesses. 
Ambiguity 
Genetic knowledge confronts us in a poignant way with 
ambiguity. On the one hand, we want to know all; our curiosity 
drives us to search and to keep on searching. 24 Genetics shows 
us much about why we are as we are, but it also enables us to 
know something about what we will be like in the future. And 
it is this ability to look into the future and control what may 
happen in the future that is so alluring. But is it too alluring? 
Are we afraid of too much self knowledge? 
Alongside this ambiguity goes another-the prospect of 
greatly increased control over people's lives and all pervasive 
intervention in their lives. Such control and intervention may be 
used exclusively for good, but there is always the prospect that 
this may not be the case, and we recoil from this prospect. This 
is ambiguity once again; we may be able to control others, but 
they equally will be able to control us, and may not do it with 
the best of intentions. 
Tension between Perfection and Imperfection 
Alongside this perspective stands another: the tension 
between perfection and imperfection. Some grand genetic 
vistas allude to perfectibility, improving humans in unspeci-
fied ways,2S and while such vistas are not on any current 
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genetic agendas, they feed the imagination nonetheless. But 
even in the imaginary realm, we are forced to ask whether we 
really want perfection, with its message that challenges will be 
no more? Do we really want total genetic control? Surely such 
a picture is the complete antithesis of all that human existence 
means, so that too much genetic control challenges our con-
ception of what it means to be human: we may lose our self 
identity in the process.26 
This is an issue of fundamental concern to Christians, 
although I would add it does not inevitably lead in an anti-
technology direction. What it does usher in is serious moral 
reflection about how we can enhance and substantiate our 
humanity, as people created in the image and likeness of God, 
and living within the domain of God's grace and the hope 
enshrined by that grace.27 
In order to illustrate the importance of serious moral reflec-
tion, I shall return to the present, and to an area replete with 
savage moral perplexity: the ever increasing domain of the 
agmg. 
A Final Vignette 
Too Old and Too Costly 
There is no end to the possibility of spending money to 
combat the inevitable biological decline and death inherent in 
aging. Unless curbed, therefore, a curative bias will effectively 
consume a disproportionate share of resources as it pushes 
forward the frontiers of life extension, a frontier that is in the 
nature of the case open and endless. 
That is also an attitude that effectively works to rob old age 
of meaning, though this has yet to be sufficiently noticed. Its 
implicit premise is that the only meaningful old age is one that 
places the highest priority on averting death, not on marshal-
ing our resources to help make old age a time of completion 
and enrichment. 
The Blessing of Mortality 
Leon Kass has argued that: "The attachment to life-or the 
fear of death-knows no limits, certainly not for most human 
beings. It turns out that the simple answer is best: we want to 
live and live, and not to wither and not to die."28 Alternatively, 
one may have more modest aims: not adding years to life, but 
life to years. This looks to a time when all who are alive, or at 
least the lucky ones in the lucky countries, will know in-
creased health, increased vigor, and an absence of decay or 
dementia, until the day of one's death. And yet even here 
there may be a problem. Within such a scenario, death would 
seem even more shocking than it does now. 
Perhaps both these approaches are misleading, because 
they fail to acknowledge the Christian conception of the 
"fall." In their different ways, both approaches attempt to 
escape the all pervading effects of the evil that permeates 
everything we touch or experience. They are of little help in 
sorting out ethical issues of significance in coping with the 
aged and demented, since they are attempting to escape from 
Iging and its consequences. It may be better to start from the 
premise that mortality is a blessing. Leon Kass has asked the 
question: "Is not the limit on our time the ground of our taking 
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life seriously and living it passionately? To number our days 
is the condition for making them count, to treasure and appre-
ciate all that life brings."29 
A longing for human immortality is a longing for more of the 
same. By contrast, the Christian view seeks to redirect our 
goals and longings towards God and away from ourselves. It is 
a transformation of all we have ever been, even if it builds in 
some way on our responses and priorities during this life. It 
heals our present estrangement from God in a fundamentally 
more radical way than anything possible in this present exist-
ence, and it will bring fulfillment, wholeness and complete-
ness of a sort only barely discernible now. Such immortality 
has no connection with the longing for a prolonged earthly life, 
which cannot possibly begin to satisfy our deepest aspirations. 
Using a different approach, Hans Jonas30 reaches a similar 
conclusion when he writes: 
"We are finite beings and even if our vital functions contin-
ued without impairment, there are limits to what our brains can 
store and keep adding to. It is the mental side of our being that 
sooner or later must call a halt even if the magicians of 
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biotechnology invent tricks for keeping the body machine 
going indefinitely. Old age, in humans, means a long past, 
which the mind must accommodate in its present as the sub-
stratum of personal identity . .. we could go on interminably only 
at the price of either losing the past and therewith our real 
identity, or living only in the past and therefore without a real 
present ... this would leave us stranded in a world we no longer 
understand even as spectators, walking anachronisms who 
have outlived themselves."31 
The implications of these approaches are considerable, 
since once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can 
devote our attention to living well and establishing important 
priorities for both ourselves and others. This, in turn, should 
serve as a powerful directive when treating others and deter-
mining health care priorities. This is also a directive with 
Christian underpinnings, as we seek to redeem the time, to be 
holy, to devote ourselves to the service of others, and to live as 
though we will meet Christ today. 
Toward a Synthesis 
The vignettes were selected to demonstrate a range of 
beneficiaries and a range of donors. Where do we go in the light 
of problems such as these? 
Human Dignity 
My starting point is that all human beings are to be viewed 
as having an inalienable dignity, stemming from our creation by 
God and revealed supremely in the redemption made possible 
by Christ. It rests not on what human beings can accomplish 
in material, social or spiritual terms, but on the rock of God's 
10ve.32 Consequently, human dignity is always based on what 
individuals are in the sight of God and never on what they may 
be able to do for society, for mankind, or even for God. From 
this it follows that those who are of no functional value to 
society still retain a dignity, since they remain important in the 
sight and purposes of God. Elements of this dignity are also to 
be found in those who have now died, but a short time ago were 
one of us. In a somewhat different way, elements of this 
dignity attach to human fetuses, since they have a high chance 
of becoming one of us. The dignity of human beings, therefore, 
to some degree encompasses and characterizes fetuses and 
cadavers. 
The theological notion of human dignity is implicit within 
notions of servanthood, by which we give ourselves for others, 
serving them in a self-sacrificial way, and putting their inter-
ests before our own. Such a life-style finds its warrant in the 
worth of others, and in the claims others make upon us because 
they are so like us and because they are of such value in the 
sight of God. In theological terms, these "others" are not 
simply our friends and those who will repay us fully for our 
concern, but they include our enemies, those unable to protect 
their own interests, and those on the borders of human 
personhood. 
Neighborliness 
All human beings should be valued, but all human beings 
cannot be of equal value to me-in the sense that I am obligated 
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to serve and help those in question. I am still to feel at one with 
all humanity, but I cannot rescue all humanity however much 
I may wish to do so. I am never to close my eyes to those in 
need-after all, whenever I see need about which I could do" 
something, that human being fits into what I have described 
as neighbor. I have responsibility for all such people. 
A point may come where invidious choices have to be made, 
and where all courses of action will involve loss and suffering. 
When this is the case, the lesser of the two evils is the course 
to be adopted. Unfortunately, under such circumstances 
human dignity will be sacrificed whichever course is followed. 
At this point of unavoidable tension, knowingly and very 
regrettably, the value to be ascribed to some human beings will 
have to be overridden. There is a differential, since there are 
limits. However, any course of action that downgrades or 
ignores human value (in the broader sense) is never the course 
of choice, but reflects the plight of humans in a suffering world. 
Relatedness Rather than Namelessness 
People become nameless when no one cares about them. 
This transformation into namelessness occurs, as I have indi-
cated, in tragedies of huge magnitude, and yet it is also found 
in families, societies, hospitals, and health care situations. 
Namelessness is a frequent accompaniment of illness. As 
dignity is lost through illness, especially when the illness is 
debilitating and catastrophic, enormous effort is required to 
maintain personhood and status. Namelessness may occur 
when adult and fetal cadavers are treated as little more than 
organ farms, when fetuses are regarded as impediments to an 
upwardly mobile lifestyle, when the demented aging are little 
more than expensive and unwanted byproducts of high tech-
nology medicine, and when infants are brought into the world 
to serve the medical needs of others. Relationships break 
down for the nameless ones, since relationships with a nameless 
individual cease to be meaningful. The nameless rapidly 
become relatedless, the antithesis of any moral evaluation that 
wishes to bestow dignity, hope and meaning on human beings 
as people made in the image and likeness of God. 
Humility 
In the last analysis the health professional should be char-
acterized by humility. This is the religious sense of our depen-
dence on God, in which we recognize that we are not our own, 
but belong to God to be used according to His purposes. Allen 
Verhey has argued that humility in this sense is not fatalism; "it 
does not deny the brokenness of our world or of [some people's 
bodies] ... it does not glibly identify automobile accidents 
with God's intentions. It does not call for an end to passion, it 
calls rather for us to share the passion of Christ. It disposes 
persons to bear the brokenness, sadness, and tragedy of our 
world in hope and faith and 10ve."33 
Technology, per se, will never eliminate suffering and 
tragedy; neither will it create hope. The quality of human lives 
comes from our recognition of our place in God's world, our 
willingness to learn from Him, and our ability to grow in 
wisdom and understanding. Only in this way will human 
values and human society be enriched. 
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Ambiguous Presences 
The values I have just enunciated are nothing more than a 
beginning as we come to terms with what I refer to as 
\ambiguous presences." They will not solve the specific 
dilemmas I have laid before you, and they are not intended to 
do so. Rather, they serve the important role of providing a 
paradigm based on the dignity of human beings, our role as 
neighbors, and the crucial importance of ensuring as far as 
possible that those with ambiguous presences are treated in 
ways that recognize and build on their relatedness. 
The ambiguous presences I have alluded to have included 
adult and fetal corpses required as sources of transplanted 
organs, embryos detected as carriers of certain deleterious 
genes, a dead pregnant woman as the receptacle for a growing 
fetus, and the elderly when exposed to the possibilities of 
expensive high technology medicine. Note that it is the 
context that renders these various individuals and groups 
ambiguous presences. It is the context that imposes the 
ambiguity and necessitates decision making. This should 
come as no surprise. Ambiguity is at the core of the human 
context, accentuated as it is by the successes and failures of 
biomedical technology. And ambiguity is essential to the 
human condition. It makes us view with seriousness the larger 
picture, forces us to ask deeper questions, and confronts us 
with profound theological issues. Unless we ensure that 
human values are central to this debate, they will be over-
whelmed by dubious priorities and ill conceived technologi-
cal endeavors. But this need not be so, and I hope this lecture 
. las demonstrated both the grounds of my hope, and some 
'pointers to a way forward. 
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